What is the Real Iranian Nuclear and Strategic Threat?

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For more than two decades, the United States (and Israel) have been screaming hysterics over the presumed threat of Iran and its nuclear program. But having witnessed the past several months of a US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran, it is worth looking back (and forward) to contemplate what the real threat is. Far from ending the nuclear threat, the US-Israeli war makes it more palpable; and far from posing a historical nuclear threat, Iran’s real threat was in its capacity to defend itself against regional and global imperial powers.

Israel and the US reportedly “obliterated” the Iranian nuclear program in their 12-day June 2025 war, at least according to Donald Trump (a reliably unreliable source). But it was immediately evident according to US intelligence assessments that the US had probably only sent Iran’s nuclear program back by a few months.

The Twelve-Day War of June 2025 was ostensibly launched to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Israel had issued warnings that Iran was on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon, but US intelligence assessments asserted that Iran was not pursuing a nuclear weapon, and even if it were, that it was roughly three years away from being able to produce and deliver such a weapon to a target.

In March of 2025, months before the war, the director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, told Congress that US intelligence concluded that Iran was not pursuing a nuclear weapon, a position that US intelligence has maintained since 2007 when they reported that Iran ended its pursuit of such an option back in 2003. In the wake of the June 2025 war, Trump was asked about the testimony of his top intelligence official, to which he replied, “I don’t care what she said,” and insisted that Iran was “very close” to a bomb.

Even in the midst of the Twelve-Day War, as it was being bombed by Israel, US intelligence assessments concluded that Iran was still not leaning towards the building of a bomb. But the intelligence assessments concluded that Iran might change course and pursue a bomb if the US bombed its nuclear sites (which it would do roughly a week later at the end of the 12-day war), or if its supreme leader were killed (which would happen on the first day of the start of the February 2026 war on Iran). Indeed, one of the lessons of the Twelve-Day War may have been “that having a bomb is the only protection in a threatening world,” since it provides a strong sense of deterrence against attacking a nuclear-armed power.

As Donald Trump announced his joint war of aggression with Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, he stated that, “this terrorist regime can never have a nuclear weapon,” and while again stating that the US had “obliterated the regime’s nuclear program” the previous June, he claimed, “they attempted to rebuild their nuclear program.” Trump affirmed: “We will ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon. It’s a very simple message. They will never have a nuclear weapon.”

After starting the war, Trump repeatedly claimed that Iran was two to four weeks away from building a nuclear weapon that it could use to attack Israel or the US. But nuclear experts disputed such claims, with one non-proliferation expert stating, “There was no evidence that Iran was close to a nuclear weapon.”

The 2026 war of aggression by Israel and the US killed the supreme leader and much of the country’s layers of leadership. Ayatollah Khamenei, despite his many other failings and acts of brutality, had held the line for decades that Iran would not produce a nuclear weapon. He even issued a religious fatwa in 2005 which banned the country from ever producing a nuclear weapon. But after Israel murdered him on the first day of the war, Khamenei’s logic (and fatwas) may no longer hold. Refusing to build a nuclear weapon clearly did not deter Israel or the US from attacking the country, so the logic among many regime officials might turn to the belief that only by building a nuclear weapon could they deter possible attacks and wars in the future. A former high level IDF intelligence expert on Iran, Danny Citrinowicz, asserted that in the wake of the assassination of the Ayatollah and the latest brutal war, it was more likely that the regime would pursue a nuclear weapon than abandon the program altogether.

In an interview, Citrinowicz said he was afraid “that this war will not prevent Iran from getting a bomb, but actually accelerate its plans to do so.” He even acknowledged that the US-Iran negotiations in the lead-up to the war had affirmed that the Iranians were willing to give up their ability to stockpile uranium, which would be required to make a bomb. He noted: “That was an important development because it meant that Iran was only seeking to maintain its enrichment project as a means of saving face,” and added: “If you wanted to prevent Iran from building a bomb, and that is really what the Iranians have offered, then this kind of an agreement wasn’t a bad option.” He asserted that, “an agreement prevents the Iranians from reaching a bomb, but strengthens the regime,” while a military attack on Iran “weakens the regime, but strengthens its [resolve] to reach a bomb.” The US thus chose the latter option, according to the former Israeli intelligence analyst.

The devastating war of aggression not only killed the Ayatollah, but numerous political, security and military officials of the regime. A new Ayatollah, Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the former Ayatollah, was appointed to lead the regime, and a string of new leaders rose to the top spots. The result was that the new regime leadership “looks more hawkish and militaristic at home and abroad.”

Iranian sources were also confirming that in the wake of the assassinations and war, hardliners in the government were in the ascendent position, and were increasingly calling for the country to embrace or pursue a nuclear weapons program. Many officials in the regime’s establishment were calling for the policy to be reviewed or changed, though there was no indication that the policy had yet been changed.

By June 2026, some western officials cited new data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that there was a greater risk of Iran pursuing a nuclear weapon following the war than before it. Prior to the June 2025 war, Iran was being subjected to weekly IAEA inspections, after which that process came to a halt.

In late July 2026, several months into the war, US intelligence agencies were warning that the new leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, and the much harder-line Iranian government, were far more open to the possibility of creating a nuclear weapon than all the prior leadership.

The United States and Israel have made the Middle East a substantially more dangerous region. Their two wars of aggression against Iran – first in June 2025 and now the seemingly-unending war that began in February of 2026 – far from halting or deterring Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, have instead created a more hardline government which may pursue nuclear weapons as a future deterrent. This in turn pushes Saudi Arabia to obtain or develop its own nuclear program and nuclear weapons, whether with the support of the United States or Pakistan. And this makes Israel, the only nuclear-armed power in the region, all the more likely to engage in warfare against any nearby nations pursuing nuclear weapons programs. Israel could, in the nightmare scenario, even turn to using its own nuclear weapons. It is, after all, the only country in the region where a government minister (from the most extreme right wing Jewish Power party led by Itamar Ben-Gvir) even publicly suggested, early on in the genocide of Gaza, that Israel could consider dropping a nuclear weapon on the besieged strip.

Though US politicians and presidents have repeatedly warned of Iran’s possible atomic threat, let alone Israeli leaders who have long raised the spectre of a nuclear Holocaust, US intelligence assessments have consistently asserted that the Iranians were not pursuing such a weapons program or policy. But defense and intelligence agencies also assessed what they viewed as the real threat from Iran.

A 2010 assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) acknowledged that Iran’s security and military doctrine was built upon deterrence, not aggression. “Iran’s military strategy is designed to defend against external or ‘hard’ threats from the United States and Israel. Iran’s principled of military strategy include deterrence, asymmetrical retaliation, and attrition warfare.” The DIA described Iran as pursuing a “defensive military doctrine, which is designed to slow an invasion and force a diplomatic solution to hostilities.” It was focused on building “its capability to counter more advanced adversaries.”

The Pentagon’s 2010 Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran noted that the country’s “security strategy is based first on deterring an attack,” affirming the DIA assessment that: “Iran’s military strategy is designed to defend against external or ‘hard’ threats from the United States and Israel,” and acknowledged that the country’s “nuclear program and its willingness to keep open the possibility of developing nuclear weapons is a central part of its deterrent strategy.” Ultimately, Iran maintained a “defensive military doctrine.”

In other words, the primary “threat” from Iran is that it is capable of defending itself, and potentially even extending its influence and power through the region. For the United States and Israel, two highly militaristic and imperialistic countries which have waged more wars in the Middle East than any two other countries, undertaking substantial invasions and occupations, the ability of another country to defend itself from an attack is perceived as a threat to their own hegemony over the region. Thus, while intelligence assessments may acknowledge that Iran’s strategy is ultimately one of deterrence and defense, by the time this filters through the political and media propaganda landscapes of the United States (let alone Israel), the public is made to believe that Iran is pursuing an aggressive militaristic policy pursuing nuclear weapons to destroy Israel and possibly even attack the United States. This is then used to justify clearly aggressive and expansionary policies of the US and Israel, framed as acts of self-defense, but which are in fact illegal acts of aggression, historically recognized as the “supreme international crime.”

After more than two decades of claiming Iran was perpetually on the verge of creating a nuclear weapon and posed an existential threat to all western allies in the region, if not the world, the United States and Israel proved once again that they are the two greatest threats to peace in the world, that they are the aggressors, that they pose a nuclear and strategic threat to the region and the world. And through their criminal acts of aggression, the United States and Israel may have created the threat they claimed they were stopping: a nuclear-armed Iran. After nearly a quarter-century of fear mongering over Iran’s capacity to defend itself from aggressors, the US and Israel have emboldened and empowered and made more extreme the Iranian regime. And in so doing, they have dramatically destabilized the region and the world. Through their own monstrous acts, the US and Israel may have created the monster they claimed they were stopping.

Andrew Gavin Marshall is a writer and researcher of politics, history, and economics based in Toronto, Canada. His website is Empire and Economics, he hosts the podcast ‘In This Mad World.’ You can subscribe to his Substack and follow him on YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, or Twitter, and be sure to subscribe to his bi-weekly News Junkies newsletter.