War and Nuclear Power: The Arab States and Israel Against Iran

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The Trump administration recently announced a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, a deal that was so generous to the Saudis it would theoretically permit them to have the ability to enrich their own uranium to the point of making a bomb. In short, the exact (stated) issue for which Israel and the United States went to war with Iran (to halt its possible nuclear weaponization), was then offered up on a platter to Saudi Arabia.

However, Trump quickly took to social media to add on new conditions to the deal; notably, that for the Saudis to get the deal they must normalize relations with Israel, something the Saudis have vocally said they would refuse to do unless Israel takes moves toward accepting a Palestinian state (something the Israelis have moved so far away from even pretending to entertain). This condition likely killed the deal that was just announced.

But on the issue of nuclear enrichment, there is a strange triangle of power relations in the region between Israel, the (oil-rich) Arab states, and Iran. The relationship between the Arab states and Israel has been historically fraught, and as is evident from the likely failure of the deal, continues to be politically challenging. But the Arab states and Israel find much common ground in their approach to how they deal with what they perceive as the threat of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

In a little more than a decade since the Obama administration signed the Iran nuclear deal, the Arab states (particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) grew closer to the Israeli position toward Iran. When the Iranian nuclear deal was announced in 2015, which would limit Iran’s enrichment capabilities in return for lifting of sanctions, President Barack Obama stated, “Put simply, no deal means a greater chance of more war in the Middle East.”

As the Obama administration was working on the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, there were several constituencies that were opposing it. Apart from US Republicans who opposed everything Obama attempted to do, regardless of rationale, the deal was also strongly opposed by both Israel and Saudi Arabia, among other Gulf allies of the US. As talks were ongoing, the Saudi monarch died and a new king, Salman, came to power, and brought with him his son, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), then appointed as defense minister and chief to the royal court, soon to become the most powerful person in Saudi Arabia. He launched the war on Yemen, backed the Egyptian dictatorship, supported jihadist armed groups in Syria, and sought to more strongly oppose Iranian influence across the region.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denounced the deal as a “historic mistake” which could cause “a horrific war.” Netanyahu repeatedly lobbied against what he called a “bad deal” and said that, “It would increase the risks of nuclear proliferation in the region and the risks of a horrific war.” Additionally, he demanded that any deal with Iran also include “a clear and unambiguous recognition of Israel’s right to exist.” Netanyahu reportedly warned Obama that the deal could “threaten the survival of Israel.”

Gulf Arab allies of the United States, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar all feared the consequences of a US nuclear deal with Iran, particularly what it meant for strengthening Iran’s role in the region, which they viewed as a counterweight to their own regional influence. Diplomats from Arab states were arguing that the US could assuage their fears by entering into formal defense agreements with them, or to upgrade their alliance status to “major non-NATO allies” (a status Bahrain and Kuwait already held at that time), as well as advancing increased arms sales to the region.

Saudi Arabia and Israel increasingly found themselves aligned not just on the Iran nuclear deal, but also on a number of broader issues, particularly as it related to opposing Iran’s influence in the region, whether through Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen.

After the Iran nuclear deal was officially reached and announced in mid-July 2015, Netanyahu warned, “The world is a much more dangerous place today than it was yesterday.” Upon announcement of the deal, Netanyahu declared, “Israel is not bound by this deal with Iran because Iran continues to seek our destruction,” adding, “We will always defend ourselves.”

One Saudi diplomat called the deal “extremely dangerous.” President Obama telephoned Saudi King Salman and other Arab Gulf leaders to reassure them of US support and that the deal would not threaten them. Though some Arab leaders, including Qatar and Oman and even to a degree, the UAE, saw potential economic benefits from the region opening up to Iran and as a result of the lifting of sanctions.

But the Arab states decided that there was little to gain in publicly opposing the nuclear deal, and instead sought to leverage their fears into getting support for other means to counter Iranian influence in the region, such as getting increased military training and intelligence sharing from the United States. The Pentagon agreed to a $1 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia as a means to help address the Kingdom’s fears about Iran, and to support its war efforts against Islamic State in Iraq and in its brutal war against Yemen.

Israel and Netanyahu took another tactic, which was to openly oppose the deal and heavily lobby the American Congress and public against it. A tactic which failed. The major pro-Israel political lobbying group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), lost its $30 million advertising and lobbying effort to oppose the deal. But even after he failed, Netanyahu continued to publicly deride the deal as “a very bad deal.”

So the Saudis resigned themselves to accept the deal but push for their own interests, while the Israelis just continued to attack the deal and fantasize about how the deal would purportedly lead to apocalyptic ends for Israel and the world. Once Donald Trump became president, however, both the Saudis and Israelis saw an opportunity. Crown Prince MBS was pushing Trump in 2018 to take a harder line on Iran.

While visiting the White House in 2018, the Crown prince renewed Saudi Arabia’s attack on the Iran nuclear deal, warning, “If they have a nuclear weapon, it’s a shield for them to let them do whatever they want in the Middle East, to make sure that no one attacks them or they will use their nuclear weapons.” He urged Trump to abandon the nuclear deal with Iran and replace it with a stronger one that also deals with Iran’s broader influence in the region.

In May 2018, Donald Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions on the country. Israel quickly announced public support for Trump’s withdrawal. As did Saudi Arabia. The UAE and Bahrain also supported the move. In particular, Israel, Saudi Arabi and the UAE had all lobbied the Trump administration to abandon the nuclear deal with Iran. And they were essentially the only countries in the world that were happy the deal was abandoned.

The Saudis were meanwhile lobbying the US government in 2018 to sell it designs to build nuclear plants in the Kingdom, and with the provision that they would produce their own nuclear fuel instead of buying it cheaper abroad, meaning that if they so desired, they could then enrich uranium to weapons-grade material. The insistence of the Saudis on being able to produce their own fuel prompted American intelligence agencies to try to figure out if the Saudis were attempting to build their own bomb, the very issue that the Obama administration attempted to resolve in its 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

The launching of the US and Israeli war on Iran at the end of February 2026 followed months of heavy lobbying efforts by Israel and Netanyahu, which ultimately convinced Trump, but not really anyone else in his cabinet, to favour a war with Iran.

In January, the US Arab allies in the region were largely cautioning the Trump administration against carrying out strikes on Iran, fearing the consequences to their own countries as such a war would surely spread rapidly through the region. The Trump administration warned them to get ready for a US strike, but its Arab allies began pressing the administration to hold back. Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar were reportedly warning Trump that such an attack would raise oil prices and hurt the US economy, though the UAE reportedly did not take part in the effort to persuade the US against undertaking strikes. Gulf allies even warned that they wouldn’t allow the US to use their airspace or territory to attack Iran, with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia issuing such warnings.

Yet on the first day of bombing, on February 28, the Washington Post reported that over the previous month of February, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had apparently changed his tune and began lobbying Trump – alongside the Israelis – to undertake a bombing campaign against Iran. While the Saudis were publicly pushing for diplomacy, the Crown Prince made repeated private phone calls to Donald Trump urging him to attack. Once the war was underway and a few weeks had passed, the Crown Prince was reportedly urging Trump “to keep hitting the Iranians hard,” according to the New York Times. Nearly a month into the war, the Crown Prince was urging Trump to continue the war, believing there was a “historic opportunity” to remake the region. The Saudis wanted the war to end, but only with what they would consider a positive outcome: having defeated Iran.

After largely having lobbied against starting the war, once it was underway the Gulf Arab states began pushing for the Trump administration to follow through and finish the job, fearing that a quick settlement would leave Iran more empowered in the region, which would overall become less stable. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were in particular lobbying the Trump administration to finish the war decisively. If the Iranians wouldn’t agree to extensive restrictions on their missile, drone and nuclear programs, both Arab states favoured an escalated military campaign. As Saudi intelligence confirmed that the Kingdom was urging the US to escalate, Trump himself said of the Crown Prince, “he’s a warrior. He’s fighting with us.” At the end of March, it was reported that the Saudis, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait were all urging Trump through private conversations that the military attacks should end only when there was substantial changes in Iran’s leadership or behavior.

According to the Wall Street Journal in May, the UAE had secretly carried out military strikes on Iran, though refused to acknowledge this publicly. Days later, it was reported that Saudi Arabia had also carried out strikes against Iran. The UAE reportedly carried out dozens of attacks on Iran over several weeks in direct coordination with the US and Israel.

In just a little over a decade, key American-allied Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE had moved from a position of a kind of uneasy but unspoken alliance with Israel on pressuring the United States to abandon its nuclear deal with Iran, to becoming active participants in bombing Iran alongside the US and Israel, after the latter two launched their joint war of aggression against the country. The great irony, of course, is that all these domineering, wealthy and powerful states and alliances have failed to meet even a modicum of their stated objectives in the war with Iran. And Iran, for its part, while battered and bruised and subjected to immense brutality, has also defended itself against all of these states, asserted its newfound dominance in the Gulf (notably over the Strait of Hormuz), and the implications of the war may ultimately drive it towards trying to obtain a nuclear weapon.

Thus, the apparent fears that united the Arab regimes and Israel against Iran, in opposing the nuclear deal and supporting the war, may ultimately bring about their great fear that they were apparently trying to stop: a nuclear-armed Iran. Not only was the war a monumental failure, but it was a colossal catastrophe for stability in the region, and has left all the states involved weaker and more exposed. It is the manifestation of a crumbling empire desperately seeking to maintain its power projection and influence. And it is failing spectacularly.

The Gulf Arab states and Israel have long aligned with the United States in extending its imperial influence in the region; it only makes sense that their own power begins to wane with that of declining US power. But it also makes all of them more desperate and dangerous. The real issue at stake is not that of Iranian nuclear enrichment, but of US imperial influence. Empires tend to be most violent at their beginnings and their ends: when they are attempting to build and establish their imperium, and when they are desperately trying to hold onto it. No doubt, the historians of the future will look back on the Iran war as a radical accelerant for the decline of the American empire, and quite possibly the decline of Israeli and Arab regime power as well.

Andrew Gavin Marshall is a writer and researcher of politics, history, and economics based in Toronto, Canada. His website is Empire and Economics, he hosts the podcast ‘In This Mad World.’ You can subscribe to his Substack and follow him on YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, or Twitter, and be sure to subscribe to his bi-weekly News Junkies newsletter.